If It Comes Up Again Well Vote on It Phrase

Last Updated: November ii, 2021

Mis- and disinformation can undermine public confidence in the electoral procedure, also every bit in our commonwealth.  Elections are administered by land and local officials who implement numerous safeguards to protect the security of your vote pursuant to various state and federal laws and processes. This resource is designed to debunk mutual misinformation and disinformation narratives and themes that relate broadly to the security of ballot infrastructure and related processes. It is non intended to address jurisdiction-specific claims. Instead, this resource addresses election security rumors by describing common and generally applicable protective processes, security measures, and legal requirements designed to protect against or observe large-scale security bug related to election infrastructure and processes.

You can learn more than about mis- and disinformation from CISA'southward Mis-, Dis-, Malinformation (MDM) team. Click an icon below to go directly to that section.

New Rumor Vs. Reality

Reality: Safeguards protect the integrity of the mail-in/absentee ballot process, including relating to the use of mail-in/absentee election asking forms.

Rumor: People can easily violate the integrity of the mail-in/absentee election request process to receive and bandage unauthorized mail-in/absentee ballots, or forestall authorized voters from voting successfully in person.

Become the Facts: Election officials utilize various security measures to protect the integrity of the mail-in/absentee voting process, including those that protect against the unauthorized use of election asking forms, in states where such forms are used, the submission of mail-in/absentee ballots past ineligible individuals, and eligible in-person voters being erroneously precluded from being able to vote due to being listed in the poll volume equally having received a mail-in/absentee ballot.

Mail-in/absentee ballot asking forms typically require applicants to sign the form and affirm their eligibility to cast a postal service-in/absentee election under penalty of law. Upon receipt of a postal service-in/absentee ballot request form, election officials implement varying procedures to verify the identity and eligibility of the applicant prior to sending the applicant a mail service-in/absentee election. Such procedures include checking the signature and information submitted on the course against the corresponding voter registration record, too every bit ensuring that multiple post-in/absentee ballots are not sent in response to applications using the same voter'south information.

Election officials further implement varying procedures to verify the identity and eligibility of those who submit mail service-in/absentee ballots. Those who submit mail-in/absentee ballots are required to sign the mail-in/absentee ballot envelope. In some states, a notarized signature, the signature of a witness or witnesses, and/or a copy of valid identification is also required. Upon receipt of a mail-in/absentee ballot, election officials verify the signature on the post-in/absentee ballot envelope and/or that the mail-in/absentee ballot has been otherwise properly submitted prior to retrieving the ballot from its envelope and submitting information technology for counting. Some states notify the voter if there is a discrepancy or missing signature, affording the voter an opportunity to correct the issue.

State policies vary on how to handle an in-person voter who is listed in the poll book as having been sent a mail-in/absentee ballot. In nearly states, the voter would exist required to bandage a provisional ballot that could be later reviewed by ballot officials. In others, the voter may cast a regular ballot and any corresponding postal service-in/absentee election returned in the name of that voter would be rejected. In all such cases, instances of potential double voting or voter impersonation could be directed to appropriate authorities for investigation.

Useful Sources

• Postal service-in Voting in 2020 Infrastructure Risk Cess, CISA
• Mail-in Voting in 2020 Infrastructure Risk Infographic, CISA
• Mail-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• USPS Election Mail Information Centre, USPS
• How States Verify Absentee Ballot Applications, NCSL
• How States Verify Voted Absentee Ballots, NCSL
• States That Permit Voters to Right Signature Discrepancies, NCSL
• 52 U.S.C. § 21082
• Conditional Ballots, NCSL
• State Policies on Voting In-Person or Irresolute Vote After Requesting a Mail service/Absentee Ballot, NASS
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor25

Reality: Robust safeguards protect against tampering with ballots returned via drop box.

Rumor: Driblet boxes used past election officials to collect returned mail-in/absentee ballots can be hands tampered with, stolen, or destroyed.

Become the Facts: Election officials use various safeguards to protect ballots returned past voters via drib boxes from existence tampered with, stolen, or destroyed. Drop boxes located outdoors are typically fabricated of heavy and high-course metallic, bolted to the footing, and include security features such as locks, tamper-evident seals, minimally sized ballot insertion slots, and burn and water-damage prevention features. Drop boxes located indoors are typically staffed and protected by existing building security measures. Many election offices monitor their driblet boxes via 24-hour video surveillance. Ballots returned via driblet box are retrieved by ballot officials or designated individuals, often in bi-partisan teams, at frequent intervals.

Useful Sources

• Ballot Drop Box, Election Infrastructure Subsector'due south Regime Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating Council Joint COVID-19 Working Group
• Election Drop Box Definitions, Design Features, Location, and Number, NCSL
• Voting Outside the Polling Identify: Absentee, All-Mail service and other Voting at Home Options, NCSL
• Your local or country election officials. EAC state-by-land directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor24

Post-Election

Reality: Ballot treatment procedures protect against intentional or unintentional ballot destruction.

Rumor: Ballots can hands be destroyed without detection, preventing them from being counted.

Go the Facts:States have ballot processing and tabulation safeguards designed to ensure each ballot bandage in the election tin can be correctly counted. State procedures often include robust chain-of-custody procedures, auditable logging requirements, and canvass processes. Election officials use these security measure to check that votes are accurately accounted for during processing and counting.

Per federal law, all ballots, applications, and registrations related to elections for federal offices, such as those for President and Vice President, Members of the U.Southward. Senate or House of Representatives, must be retained and preserved for 22 months from the date of the election. In addition, many states also require specific state and local security protocols for stored ballots, such as storage in a secure vault featuring double lock systems that tin only be opened when authorized representatives from both political parties are present. This requirement is intended to ensure all ballots and relevant records, such as voter registrations, cannot be discarded, just are bachelor in case they are needed for recounts or audits to resolve any potential issues.

Election officials, based on state and local police, may discard non-relevant materials, such as addressed envelopes or duplicate applications. Taken out of context, images or video of ballot officials discarding papers may appear suspicious , but are likely depicting legal discarding of these not-relevant election materials.

Useful Sources:

• 52 U.S.C. § 20701
• Retention Chart for Boards of Elections, State of Ohio
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Take chances Cess and Infographic, CISA
• Your local or country election officials. EAC state-past-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor22

Reality: Variations in vote totals for different contests on the same ballot occur in every ballot and do not by themselves point fraud or bug with voting technology.

Rumor: More than votes in one contest than other contests on the ballot means that results cannot be trusted.

Get the Facts:Variations in vote totals for different contests on the aforementioned ballot occur in every election. For case, this tin can occur as a result of "undervotes." These variations by themselves are not indications of problems with voting technology or the integrity of election processes or results.

An undervote occurs when a voter intentionally or unintentionally does not make a selection in a given contest on their election (eastward.g., a voter votes for a presidential candidate, but non for whatever candidates in other contests on their ballot) or, where a voter selects fewer than the maximum number allowed for a particular contest. Undervotes commonly occur on so-called "down-ballot" races. For instance, a voter may choose to vote for president, senator, and governor, just not for other offices or election measures that are lower down on their ballot. Even if a election includes an undervote in a particular contest, properly marked votes on their ballot are counted.

Useful Sources

• Your local or state election officials. EAC country-past-state directory
• Voter Intent Laws, NCSL
• Post-Election Audits, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor20

Reality: Robust safeguards including canvassing and auditing procedures help ensure the accuracy of official election results.

Rumor: A bad player could modify ballot results without detection.

Get the Facts: The systems and processes used by ballot officials to tabulate votes and certify official results are protected by various safeguards that help ensure the accuracy of election results. These safeguards include measures that help ensure tabulation systems function as intended, protect confronting malicious software, and enable the identification and correction of any irregularities.

Every state has voting organization safeguards to ensure each ballot cast in the election can be correctly counted. Country procedures often include testing and certification of voting systems, required auditable logs, and software checks, such every bit logic and accurateness tests, to ensure ballots are properly counted before election results are made official. With these security measures, election officials can bank check to determine that devices are running the certified software and operation properly.

Every state as well has laws and processes to verify vote tallies before results are officially certified. State processes include robust chain-of-custody procedures, auditable logs, and canvas processes. The vast majority of votes bandage in this election will be cast on paper ballots or using machines that produce a newspaper audit trail, which let for tabulation audits to be conducted from the paper record in the result any issues emerge with the voting organization software, audit logs, or tabulation. These canvass and certification procedures are likewise generally conducted in the public heart, as party representatives and other observers are typically allowed to be present, to add an additional layer of verification. This means voting system software is not a single point of failure and such systems are subject to multiple audits to ensure accuracy and reliability. For example, some counties acquit multiple audits, including a post-election logic and accurateness test of the voting system, and a bipartisan mitt count of paper ballots.

Useful Sources

• Election Results Reporting Risks and Mitigations Infographic, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Mail-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Mail-in Voting Processing Factors Map (Updated October 29, 2020), CISA
• Post-Ballot Procedure Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Your local or state election officials. EAC country-by-state directory
• Post-election audits, NCSL
• Policies for Election Observers, NSCL
• Tabulation Security, Maricopa Canton AZ
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor17

Reality: The Section of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) practice not design or audit ballots, which are processes managed by state and local election officials.

Rumor: DHS or CISA printed paper ballots with security measures and is auditing results as a countermeasure confronting ballot counterfeiting.

Get the Facts:While DHS and CISA assist states and localities with securing election infrastructure, DHS and CISA exercise not design, print, or audit ballots. Country and local ballot officials manage ballot design and printing, too as the auditing of results.

Local ballot offices have security and detection measures in identify that brand it highly difficult to commit fraud through counterfeit ballots. While the specific measures vary, in accordance with country and local election laws and practices, ballot security measures tin can include signature matching, information checks, barcodes, watermarks, and precise paper weights.

DHS and CISA operate in back up of state and local election officials, and practise not administer elections or handle ballots. CISA'due south role in ballot security includes sharing information, such as cyber threat indicators, with state and local election officials, likewise every bit providing technical cybersecurity services (e.1000., vulnerability scanning) upon the request of those officials. CISA funded an contained third-party to develop an open up-source ballot auditing tool for voluntary use past state and local election officials. (Note: The previous judgement was updated 9 November 2020.) CISA does non audit elections and does non take admission to the tool as states apply it.

Useful Sources

• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Ballot Security, DHS
• Federal Role in U.Southward. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, CRS
• Postal service-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Postal service-in Voting 2020 Risk Assessment, CISA
• Hazard-Limiting Audits with Arlo, Voting Works
• Your local or state ballot officials EAC land-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor19

Reality: Election results reporting may occur more slowly than some voters expect. This alone does not indicate a problem with the counting process or results, or that there are issues affecting the integrity of the election. Official results are non certified until all validly cast ballots accept been counted, including ballots that are legally counted after election night.

Rumor: If results as reported on election nighttime alter over the ensuing days or weeks, the process is hacked or compromised, and so I can't trust the results.

Get the Facts:The timeline for reporting election results may exist impacted by a number of factors, including changes to country or local level policies that affect how the ballot is administered, changes to when ballots can be candy, or additional protocols implemented to make voting and vote processing safer during the pandemic. Election results reported on election night are always unofficial and are provided solely for voters' convenience. In fact, no state requires that official results be certified on election night itself. Fluctuations in unofficial results reporting will occur during and subsequently ballot night as more than ballots are processed and counted, frequently including military and overseas ballots, and validated conditional ballots. Variations in state processes may likewise mean ballots cast through different methods (e.g., early in-person voting, mail-in voting, and ballot twenty-four hour period voting) are counted and unofficially reported in different orders. Official results are released after rigorous canvassing (verification) and certification by local and state election officials.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Strange Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2020 Ballot Results
• Ballot Results Reporting Risks and Mitigations, CISA
• Post-in Voting 2020 Gamble Assessment, CISA
• Mail service-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Mail-in Voting Processing Factors Map (Updated October 29, 2020), CISA
• Post-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• USPS Ballot Mail Information Centre, USPS
• Federal Election Results FAQs, CRS
• State Election Canvassing Timeframes and Recount Thresholds, NASS
• After the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Election, NCSL
• Ballot Security State Policies, NCSL
• Changes to Post in Voting in 2020, NCSL
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor14

Reality: Provisional ballots are counted in every election regardless of outcome margins.

Rumor: Provisional ballots are simply counted if there'southward a close race.

Get the Facts:All provisional ballots are reviewed by election officials in every ballot regardless of consequence margins. Provisional ballots bandage by individuals whose eligibility can exist verified are counted. Additionally, election officials are required to provide individuals who cast provisional ballots written information regarding how they tin can make up one's mind whether their vote was counted and, if it was not counted, the reason for its rejection.

Useful Sources

• 52 U.South.C. § 21082
• Post-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Provisional Ballots, NCSL
• Land Policies on Voting In-Person or Changing Vote After Requesting a Mail service/Absentee Ballot, NASS
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Link direct to this rumor past using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor15

Reality: In some circumstances, elections officials are permitted to "duplicate" or otherwise further marking bandage ballots to ensure they can be properly counted.

Rumor: Witnessing election officials mark ballots ways that fraudulent voting is taking place.

Become the Facts:Some ballots cannot be read by a ballot scanner due to issues such as damage or misprinting. Some jurisdictions paw count such ballots, while others create indistinguishable ballots so they can be read past a ballot scanner. Some jurisdictions permit election officials to heighten markings on ballots that are too faint to scan post-obit a process to adjudicate the voter's intent based on state law. In jurisdictions where duplication of unscannable ballots is permitted, election officials duplicate the election precisely to ensure all the voter'south choices are transferred correctly to the new election. Both the original and duplicate ballot are labeled and logged then that the 2 ballots tin can exist tracked and audited. Many jurisdictions require bipartisan teams of ii or 4 personnel to complete this process and verify that votes are accurately transferred to duplicated ballots. The process is frequently open up to public observation.

In some jurisdictions, ballot duplication is referred to as ballot remaking, ballot replication, or ballot transcription.

Useful Sources

• After the Voting Ends: The Steps to Consummate an Ballot, NCSL
• Ballot Duplication web log serial, Council of State Governments Overseas Voting Initiative
• Your local or state election officials EAC country-past-land directory.
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor16

Reality: Election night results are not official results.

Rumor: If election dark reporting sites experience an outage, vote counts will be lost or manipulated.

Go the Facts: Election night results are non official results. These sites may experience outages due to a variety of problems including also many people trying to view the site or cyberattacks. Such disruptions exercise non bear on the integrity of votes or the official certified results. Ballot results made bachelor on election night are always unofficial. Official results are rigorously canvassed (reviewed), and certified by local and state election officials. Almost states have requirements for mail service-election audits as well.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Foreign Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2020 Election Results
• FBI-CISA Public Service Annunciation: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Tedious But Non Prevent Voting
• Post-Election Procedure Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Federal Ballot Results FAQs, CRS
• Link straight to this rumor past using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor11

Reality: A defaced or manipulated ballot night reporting webpage would not impact counting and certification of official results.

Rumor: If the ballot night reporting webpage is defaced or displays incorrect results, the integrity of the election is compromised.

Get the Facts: If a webpage has been defaced or is displaying wrong results, it would not impact the integrity of votes or the official certified results. Election results fabricated available on election nighttime are always unofficial.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Foreign Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2020 Election Results
• FBI-CISA Public Service Declaration: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Slow Only Not Forestall Voting
• Post-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor12
  

Reality: Malicious actors tin can use fake personas and impersonate real accounts.

Rumor: If a social media account claims an identity, the account must be run by that person or arrangement.

Get the Facts:Malicious actors often use fake personas and impersonate real accounts to trick the public into believing disinformation, including election-related disinformation.

Popular social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, and others provide an indication, such as a checkmark that is either blueish or grey, to indicate that an account is verified by the platform.  If an account claims to be a well-known person or official system but is not verified, they may be an imposter.

There are multiple things to wait for if you lot think an business relationship is fake or spoofed. Is the business relationship brand new? Do they create content or merely re-share? Practise they have a coherent profile description and does it friction match what they are sharing? Do they take a existent profile photo?  A best practice when looking for election-related information is to go to trusted sources, like your local election official.

If you find a suspicious social media post or account, consider reporting the activity to the platform and then others don't get duped. Most platforms have a "report" office congenital into posts, so it's easy to report suspicious items, such as misinformation about ballot infrastructure. If an account is posting election disinformation, consider reporting to your state or local ballot official.

Useful Sources

• Election Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation Toolkit, CISA
• #TrustedInfo2020, NASS
• Voter Resource: State Voter Information, NASED
• Voting and Elections Information, usa.gov
• Your local or land ballot officials EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor1

Reality: Cyber actors tin can "spoof" or forge email sender addresses to look similar they come from someone else.

Rumor: I received an election-related email that looks similar it came from a certain organization, so the system must have sent it.

Get the Facts:Cyber actors tin can forge emails to wait similar they came from someone else. This common tactic is called electronic mail spoofing, where attackers send an email pretending to be from a specific domain or organization in an effort to harvest personal data or spread malware. Such spoofed emails tin also exist used to disseminate false or inflammatory information. To transport realistic-looking emails, cyber actors may forge the sender address to hide the origin of an email or set up spoofed domains that have a slightly different proper noun from the real domain. Always be wary of out of the ordinary emails and expect to trusted sources, such as the organization's official website, in order to verify. Never provide personal data or download files from suspicious emails. If you receive a suspicious election-related electronic mail, consider reporting it to your local election official or local FBI field role.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Spoofed Internet Domains and Email Accounts Pose Cyber and Disinformation Risks to Voters
• Actions to Counter Email-based Attacks on Election-Related Entities, CISA
• Enhanced E-mail and Web Security, CISA
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor2

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Pre-Election

Reality: Voting systems undergo testing from state and/or federal voting system testing programs, which certify voting system hardware and software.

Rumor: Voting system software is not reviewed or tested and can exist easily manipulated.

Get the Facts:Earlier use in elections, voting systems undergo hardware and software testing to ensure they are consistent with state and/or federal requirements. Under these programs, voting system manufacturers submit systems to undergo testing and review past an accredited laboratory or state testers. This testing is designed to check that systems function as designed and meet applicable state and/or federal requirements or standards for accuracy, privacy and accessibility. Certification testing usually includes a review of a system's source code every bit well every bit ecology, security and functional testing. Depending on the state, this testing may be conducted by a land-certified laboratory, a partner university, and/or a federally certified testing laboratory.

Before local jurisdictions acquire voting systems, voting systems must become through a testing procedure to ensure compliance with the land'south standards and, in many states, federal standards as well. While each state sets specific standards for voting systems, many states leverage the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines developed by the U.S. Ballot Assistance Commission.

Once systems are deemed compliant with applicable land and federal standards, jurisdictions likewise acquit logic and accuracy testing before deployment of a voting machine to ensure proper functioning and to detect any malicious or dissonant software bug. Post-election audits also help ensure the proper functioning of voting equipment.

Useful Sources:

• 52 U.S.C. §§ 20971, 21081
• Voting Arrangement Certification Process, EAC
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Adventure Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification, NCSL
• Post-Election Audits, NCSL
• Your local or land election officials. EAC land-by-country directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor23

Reality: Voter registration list maintenance and other election integrity measures protect against voting illegally on behalf of deceased individuals.

Rumor: Votes are being cast on behalf of expressionless people and these votes are beingness counted.

Become the Facts: State and Federal laws prohibit voter impersonation, including casting a election on behalf of a deceased individual. Ballot officials regularly remove deceased individuals from voter registration rolls based on decease records shared by land vital statistics agencies and the Social Security Administration. While there tin can be some lag time between a person's death and their removal from the voter registration list, which tin can lead to some mail-in ballots beingness delivered to addresses of deceased individuals, death records provide a strong inspect trail to identify any illegal attempts to bandage ballots on behalf of deceased individuals. Boosted election integrity safeguards, including signature matching and information checks, further protect against voter impersonation and voting by ineligible persons.

In some instances, living persons may return mail-in ballots or vote early in-person, and and so die before Election Day. Some states permit such voters' ballots to be counted, while others disallow such ballots and follow procedures to place and reject them during processing.

Taken out of context, some voter registration information may announced to advise suspicious activity, but are really innocuous clerical errors or the issue of intended data practices. For example, election officials in some states use temporary placeholder data for registrants whose birth date or year is not known (e.g., i/ane/1900, which makes such registrants appear to be 120 years one-time). In other instances, a voting-age kid with the same name and address every bit their deceased parent could be misinterpreted as a deceased voter or atomic number 82 to clerical errors.

Useful Sources

• 18 UsC. § 1708
• 52 UsC. §§ 10307(c), 20507, 20511(2), 21083(a)(ii)(A)
• Mail-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Ballot Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Security, DHS
• The National Voter Registration Act of 1993: Questions and Answers, DOJ
• Ballot Mail Information Center, USPS
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-past-state directory
• Maintenance of State Voter Registration Lists, NASS
• What If an Absentee Voter Dies Earlier Election Day?, NCSL
• Voter Listing Accuracy, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor21

Reality: Some voter registration data is publicly available.

Rumor: Someone possessing or posting voter registration information ways voter registration databases have been hacked .

Get the Facts: Some voter registration information is public information and is available to political campaigns, researchers, and ofttimes members of the public, frequently for purchase. According to a recent FBI and CISA public warning, cyber actors may make imitation claims of "hacked" voter data to undermine confidence in U.Southward. autonomous institutions.

Useful Sources

• Availability of State Voter File and Confidential Data
• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Imitation Claims of Hacked Voter Information Probable Intended to Cast Doubt on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections
• Access To and Use Of Voter Registration Lists, NCSL
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor3

Reality: Online voter registration websites tin experience outages for non-malicious reasons.

Rumor: An online voter registration website experiences an outage and claims are made the election has been compromised.

Get the Facts: Outages in online voter registration systems occur for a diverseness of reasons, including configuration errors, hardware issues, natural disasters, communications infrastructure problems, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. As CISA and FBI warned in a contempo public alert, a system outage does not necessarily mean the integrity of voter registration information or any other election organization has been impacted. When an outage occurs, election officials piece of work to verify the integrity of voter registration information.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Imitation Claims of Hacked Voter Information Likely Intended to Cast Doubt on Legitimacy of U.Southward. Elections
• Securing Voter Registration Data, CISA
• Your local or land election officials EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor4

Reality: A compromise of a land or local government organisation does not necessarily mean ballot infrastructure or the integrity of your vote has been compromised.

Rumor: If country or local jurisdiction it (IT) has been compromised, the election results cannot exist trusted.

Go the Facts: Hacks of state and local It systems should not exist minimized; nevertheless, a compromise of state or local IT systems does non mean those systems are election-related. Even if an election-related system is compromised, a compromise of a system does not necessarily mean the integrity of the vote has been affected. Election officials take multiple safeguards and contingencies in place, including provisional ballots or fill-in paper poll books that limit the impact from a cyber incident with minimal disruption to voting.  Additionally, having an auditable paper tape ensures that the vote count can be verified and validated.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Proclamation: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Slow Just Not Foreclose Voting
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Cess and Infographic, CISA
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor5

Reality: Malicious actors tin fake manipulation of voter registration information to spread disinformation.

Rumor: Videos, images or emails suggesting voter registration information is being manipulated means voters volition not be able to vote.

Get the Facts: Claims are easy to fake and can be used for disinformation purposes. If voter registration information were to be manipulated, states have several safeguards in place to enable voters to vote, including offline backups of registration data, provisional ballots, and in several states, same-day registration.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Proclamation: False Claims of Hacked Voter Information Likely Intended to Cast Doubt on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections
• Securing Voter Registration Data, CISA
• Securing Voter Registration Systems, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor6

Reality: Safeguards are in place to forestall home-printed or photocopied mail-in ballots from being counted.

Rumor: A malicious thespian tin easily defraud an election by press and sending in extra mail-in ballots.

Get the Facts: This is faux. Committing fraud through photocopied or home-printed ballots would be highly hard to do successfully. This is because each local election office has security measures in place to detect such malicious activity. While the specific measures vary, in accordance with state and local election laws and practices, such security measures include signature matching, information checks, barcodes, watermarks, and precise newspaper weights.

Useful Source

• Mail-in Voting Election Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor7

Reality: Safeguards are in place to protect against fraudulent voting using the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).

Rumor: A malicious thespian tin easily defraud an election using the Federal Write-In Absentee Election (FWAB).

Get the Facts:Irresolute an election using fraudulently submitted FWABs would be highly difficult to do. This is because ballot offices have security measures in place to notice such activity.

The FWAB is primarily used as a backup ballot for military and overseas voters who requested but did not notwithstanding receive their absentee ballot. FWAB users must provide their signature and meet varying state voter registration and absentee ballot asking requirements, which can include provision of full or partial social security number, state identification number, proof of identification, and/or witness signature.

Since only military and overseas voters are eligible to use the FWAB, relatively few of them are submitted each election. In 2016, states reported that only 23,291 total FWABs were submitted nationwide, with all simply six states receiving less than 1,000 FWABs statewide. Since apply is relatively rare, spikes in FWAB usage would exist detected as anomalous.

Useful Sources

• 52 U.Southward.C. § 20303
• Voting Assist Guide, FVAP
• Election Forms and Tools for Sending, FVAP
• 2016 Election Administration and Voting Survey Comprehensive Report, EAC
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor8

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Election Day

Reality: Election officials provide writing instruments that are canonical for marking ballots to all in-person voters using paw-marked paper ballots.

Rumor: Poll workers gave specific writing instruments, such every bit Sharpies, only to specific voters to cause their ballots to be rejected.

Get the Facts: Ballot jurisdictions allow voters to mark ballots with varying types of writing instruments, based on state law and other considerations such equally tabulation organization requirements. Poll workers are required to provide approved writing devices to voters.

Although felt-tip pens, like Sharpies, may bleed through ballots, some ballot officials have stated that ballot tabulation equipment in their jurisdictions can still read these ballots. Many jurisdictions even design their ballots with beginning columns to forbid whatsoever potential bleed through from impacting the ability to easily browse both sides of ballots.

If a ballot has issues that impact its ability to be scanned, it can be hand counted or duplicated, or adjudicated by election officials, who use defined procedures such every bit chain of custody to ensure protect election secrecy and integrity. Many states additionally take "voter intent" laws that permit for ballots to be counted even when issues such as bleed-throughs or stray marks are nowadays, as long every bit the voter's intent tin can still exist determined.

Useful Sources

• Later the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Election, NCSL
• Ballot Duplication weblog serial, Council of State Governments Overseas Voting Initiative
• Your local or state election officials. EAC country-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor18

Reality: Voters are protected by land and federal law from threats or intimidation at the polls, including from ballot observers.

Rumor: Observers in the polling identify are permitted to intimidate voters, campaign, and interfere with voting.

Get the Facts:While most states accept a procedure to permit a limited number of credentialed or registered observers at in-person voting locations to observe the voting procedure, land and federal laws offering voters general protection from threats and intimidation, including from observers. States apply varying terms for observers, including "poll watchers," "challengers," and "poll agents." In general, observers are prohibited from violating election secrecy, campaigning, collecting private voter information, and obstructing or interfering with the voting process. Observers in some states may study potential bug to ballot officials, such equally questioned eligibility of a voter, suspicious beliefs, or suspected rule violations. Intimidation or threatening behavior is never permissible.

Under certain circumstances, the U.S. Section of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division may monitor polling place procedures for the protection of voters nether federal voting rights laws. International observers, including delegations from the System for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Organization for American States, who have been invited past the U.Southward. Section of Country, may as well observe in-person voting processes in some states.

If you feel that you've been a victim of, or witnessed, voter intimidation or threats, please written report the experience to the DOJ Ceremonious Rights Division's Voting Department past phone 800-253-3931 or through its complaint portal at https://civilrights.justice.gov/. If you experience an emergency, please call 911.

Useful Sources

• eighteen U.s.a.C. § 245(b)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 594, 52 U.s.C. § 20511, 18 United statesC. §§ 241 and 242
• Ballot Crimes and Security, FBI
• Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, DOJ
• Near Federal Observers and Election Monitoring, DOJ
• State Laws on Poll Watchers and Challengers, NASS
• Poll Watchers and Challengers, NCSL
• Policies for Election Observers, NCSL
• OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation USA 2020 Factsheet, OSCE
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor13

Reality: Safeguards are in place to protect election secrecy.

Rumor: Someone is claiming to know who I voted for.

Get the Facts:Ballot secrecy is guaranteed by law in all states. Ballot officials implement various safeguards to protect voters' choices from being viewable or knowable past others, including the election officials themselves. With few exceptions, these security measures ensure that individual ballots, once cast, cannot be traced dorsum to the voters who cast them. For in-person voting, privacy measures include dividers between voting stations and requirements that poll workers maintain distance from voters while they are casting their ballots. For mail-in and conditional voting, election officials follow strict procedures to ensure ballot secrecy when ballots are retrieved from mail-in and provisional ballot envelopes.

Ballot secrecy rights may be voluntarily waived by voters in sure circumstances, and waiver may exist required in some of these, such as military and overseas voters that vote by fax or due east-mail.

While election choices are secret in virtually all circumstances, a voter's political party amalgamation and history of voting by and large are not. Data contained in voter registration records, such as name, address, telephone number, and political party affiliation (in states with party-based voter registration), is generally available to political parties and others. This data also regularly contains information on whether a voter voted in a particular election, but not their ballot choices.

Useful Sources

• Voting Exterior the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and other Voting at Home Options, NCSL
• Secrecy of the Ballot and Ballot Selfies, NCSL
• States that are Required to Provide Secrecy Sleeves for Absentee/Mail service Ballots, NCSL
• Access To and Employ of Voter Registration Lists, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor9

Reality: Polling place lookup sites tin feel outages for not-malicious reasons.

Rumor: If polling place lookup sites experience an outage, election infrastructure must have been compromised.

Get the Facts: Polling place lookup sites, similar all websites, may experience outages for a variety of reasons, impacting their availability to voters. Polling place lookup sites are not connected to infrastructure that counts votes and are typically segmented from infrastructure that enables voting, such as the voter registration database. Election officials will point potential voters to alternate tools and resource for this information in the consequence of an issue.

Useful Sources

• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Your local or land election officials EAC country-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor10
  

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Source: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol

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